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NOTES AND COMMENTS
IS THERE A PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON
THE TESTATOR WHEN THE ATTORNEY DRAWING
THE WILL IS MADE A BENEFICIARY THEREIN?
In the recent California case of In re Ersekson's Estate', a will
was contested on the ground of undue influence practiced upon
the testator by the attorney drawing up the will and who was
made one of the residuary legatees thereunder. Although the case
was reversed for error, the following instructions of the trial court
were approved by the upper tribunal.
"It is the general rule of law that in order to set aside
a will for undue influence, there must be substantial proof
by the contestants of a pressure which overpowered the
volition of the testator at the very time the will was made.
I instruct you, however, that there is an exception to this
rule to the effect that where one who unduly profits by the
will as a beneficiary thereunder, sustains a confidential
relation to the testator, and has actually participated in
procuring the execution of the will, the burden is shifted
upon these seeking to support the will to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was no undue
influence exercised in the execution of the will."
This case raises the quite common and interesting problem
often found in a will contest as to whether a presumption of
undue influence exists, placing the burden of proving no such
influence on the proponents of the will, when the attorney who
draws up the instrument is named as one of the beneficiaries
therein
It is the purpose of this comment to discuss this problem, but
before so doing it will be necessary in order to better understand
the question to briefly analyze the general topic of undue influence
and fraud as a ground for setting aside a will.
FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE DIsTINGuisaED

Although undue influence and fraud are commonly considered
together, they are distinct and separate. For when the latter is
exercised, the testator acts voluntarily as a free agent, but is
deceived into acting by false data, but when the former is exercised the mind of the testator is so dominated that another will
is substituted for his own. However, both can be equally destructive of the validity of a will, and it is often a mere question of
terms. Fraud may exist without undue influence being present,2
except in so far as misrepresentation amounts to influence. However, undue influence seems to arise under one of two heads,
coercion or fraud, and would seem to include both.
35 Pac. (2d) 628 (1934).
2In re Morcel's Estate, 162 Cal. 188, 121 Pac. 733 (1912).
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UNDUE INFLUENCE:
I. DEFINiTION

Undue influence such as will invalidate a will is not easy to
define with precision. It must be such as to control the mental
operation of the testator, overcome his power of resistance, and
oblige him to adopt the will of another, 8 thus producing a disposition of property which the testator would not have made if left
to act according to his own pleasure. The means of control are
not important, and may consist of force or coercion, violence or
threatened violence or moral coercion;'
The extent or degree of the influence is wholly immaterial, if
sufficient to make the act in question the act of another rather than
the expression of the mind and heart of the actor. But to destroy
the validity of a will the undue influence must be specially directed
on the testamentary act, so that-its effect may be registered there,'6
and must be sufficient to destroy the free agency of the testator,
and control the disposition of his property under the will. Mere
passion and prejudice, the ordinary influence of peculiar religious
or secular training imbided in the natural course of one's experience and contact with society, cannot be set up as undue influence
to defeat a will. 7 Mere advice or suggestions, addressed to the
sound judgment of the testator and intelligently weighed and considered by him do not constitute undue influence unless they are
so strongly and persistently urged that the testator is unable
to resist adopting them," although the will mighi not have been
made but for such advice or persuasion. Influence arising from
mere acts of kindness, attention, and congenial intercourse, which
operate to secure or retain the affection, esteem or good will of
the testator, and induce him to make the persons performing such
kindly deeds beneficiaries in his will, do not constitute undue
influence, 9 unless such acts are carried out with the purpose and
design of subjecting the mind of the testator to the influence and
direction of the person exercising the influence, and thus deprive
the testator of is free will, free act and free agency
3In re Ramsdell's Estate, (Iowa), 244 N. W 744 (1932) "Influence, to
be undue, within the meaning of the law, must be such as to substitute
the will of the person exercising the influence for that of ,the testator,
thereby making the writing express, not for the purpose and intent of
the testator, but that of the person exercising the undue influence."
'Hall's Her v. Hall's Executors, 38 Ala. 131 (1876).
5
Mallow v. Walker 115 Ia. 238, 88 N. W 452 (1901) Engbert v. Engbert, 198 Pa. St. 326, 47 Atl. 940 (1901).
O'Dell v. Golf, 149
aIn re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 228, 49 Pac. 192 (1847)
Mich. 152, 112 N. W 736 (1907).
7Stevens v. Leonard, 154 Ind. 67, 56 N. E. 27 (1900).
ni re Wayne's
"Flanigan v. Smith, 337 Ill. 572, 169 N. E. 767 (1929)
Estate, 134 Or. 464, 291 Pac. 356 (1930) Barbee v. Barbee, 134 Wash. 418,
235 Pac. 945 (1925).
In re Ball's Es9Ater v. McClure, 329 Ill. 519, 161 N. E. 129 (1928)
tate, 153 Wis. 27, 141 N. W. 8 (1913) where it was held that the natural
attentions of the wife to her invalid husband, and her helpful effort in
caring for his business and property were not indicative that the will
was the product of undue influence exerted by her.
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The Washington court in its decisions has recognized substantially the same definitions and tests of undue influence as stated
above. An exhaustive study was made by the court in the case of
In re Patterson's Estate,10 as to just what comprised the undue
influence necessary to set aside a will. It was therein stated by
the court that, "undue influence in procuring the execution of a
will is not established by showing persuasion or argument which
prevailed upon the testator to make some particular disposition
of his estate. To vitiate the will an influence must be shown
which, at the time of the testamentary act, controlled the volition
of the testator, deprived him of his free will agency, and prevented
an exercise of his judgment and choice. He may have been subjected to counsel, suggestions, and persuasion, or even importunity,
yet if it can be shown, as in this case, that he had testamentary
capacity, and at the time of making the will was free and unrestrained in exercising his volition it cannot be held that undue
influence has been shown." In the latter case of In re Adam's
Estate," the Washington court again expressed itself regarding
the question of undue influence by stating "Undue influence which
will avoid a will must amount to coercion or fraud. It must be
an influence tantamount to force or fear which destroys the free
agency of the party and constrains him to do what is against his2
will." And in the quite recent case of In re Simpson's Estate,'
this same doctrine was recognized and the former cases cited with
approval. The court through Justice Main said "In the texts and
adjudicated cases, what would constitute undue influence has
been defined in different phraseology In essence, they all substantially come down to stating, in effect, that such influence,
which would vitiate a will, must be shown by the evidence to be
such that the testator's volition, at the time of the testamentary
act, was controlled by another, and that the will was not the
result of a free exercise of judgment and choice."
II. EFFECT

When the probate of a will is contested on the ground of undue
influence, one or more of the provisions of the will may be sustained as valid, while others are set aside, if the portion of the
will which was the result of undue influence can be separated
from the parts not thereby effected." But if the undue influence
affects the entire will, though exercised by only one of the beneficiaries, it is invalid, for the will is not the act of the testator
unless it is his free and voluntary act.
,O68 Wash. 377, 123 Pac. 515 (1912).
1 120 Wash. 189, 206 Pac. 947 (1922).
-"
169 Wash. 419, 14 Pac (2d) 1 (1932).
"Old Colony Trust Co. v. Bailey, 202 Mass. 283, 88 N. E. 898 (1909)
In re Carson's Estate, 184 Cal. 417, 194 Pac. 5 (1920) where it was held
that fraudulent misrepresentation by the residuary legatee that he was
the lawful husband of the testatrix whereby the testatrix was induced to
make him the residuary legatee and executor, do not invalidate the will
as to the other legatees, in the absence of any showing that the bequests
to them were affected in any way by the misrepresentations.
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FRAUD

I. DEFINITION

The fraud necessary to invalidate a will has been held not to
differ from that required to vitiate an ordinary contract. 14 To
invalidate the will, the deception must have been such as to have
induced the testator to make a disposition of his property which
he would not otherwise have made, and to constitute such, it must
have affected the testator in the very act of malung his will, and
it must be shown that the testator was actually deceived. 15 Fraud
sufficient to -vitiate a will may consist of the intentional concealment of a material fact, 16 the wrongful altering of the will, or
the failing fully and properly to advise the testator. There is
no doubt but that slander invalidates the will and hence the court
may declare a will invalid for fraud on evidence of false representations made by the beneficiary or proponent to the testator, as
where false accusations are made against the natural objects of
the testator's bounty' 1
The Washington court has also had to pass on the question of
fraud as a ground for setting aside testamentary documents, but
it would seem that the court has decided each case upon the particular facts involved therein. Thus, no case has come to the front
as containing a concise and accurate statement of the fraud necessary to invalidate the instrument. However, the court has recogized the general principles as herein set out, and is, therefore,
in accord with the weight of authority in the handling of this
problem.
II. EFFECT
Where the fraud is of such character that the testator is misled
or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which
he executes, the instrument, or that portion of it with reference
to which the fraud was practiced is rendered invalid, for the
reason that there is a want of testamentary intent. And such is
the holding where the fraud relates to some extrinsic fact, and
as a consequence of the deception the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
But to vitiate any part of the will, it is essential to actual fraud
that the misrepresentation be made with intent to deceive the
testator or to induce him to execute the will. Thus, in the case of
In re Ray's Estate,' where the husband made a false representation to his wife, the testatrix, and the contestant thereafter attempted to set aside the will on the ground of fraud, the court
properly said. "The representation, assuming that it was not
true, was honestly made, and was therefore not fraudulent."

11Knox

-v. Perkmns, (N. H.), 163 Atl. 497 (1932).
SZade v. Slade, 155 Ga. 851, 118 S. E. 645 (1923) where the fact that
the proponent of a will deceived witnesses as to the character of the
paper, did not result in fraud invalidating the will, where the testatrix
was not deceived.
20In re Nutt's Estate, 181 Cal. 522, 181 Pac. 393 (1919).
"'Frank
lin v. .Bett, 130 Ga. 37, 60 S. E. 146 (1908).
2113 Wash. 277, 193 Pac. 682 (1920).
5
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PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
I. IN GENERAL

In accordance with the general principles relating to presumption and burden of proof, it is usually held that when a will
appears to have been duly executed and attested according to the
statute of wills the law presumes it to be valid, and the burden
of proof rests upon whoever alleges it to be the product of undue
influence."0

This rule was closely adhered to by the Washington

Supreme court in the case of Hunt v. Phillips,20 where the court
speaking through Justice Dunbar said "On the contest of a
will which has been admitted to probate ex parte, the burden of
proof is upon the contestants to establish every material fact alleged." Substantially the same rule has been embodied in the
Washington probate code 21 which reads as follows
"In

any such contest proceedings (will contests2 2 ) the

previous order of the court probating or refusing to probate, such will shall be prima famie evidence of the legality
of such will, if probated, or its illegality, if rejected, and
the burden of proving the illegality of such will, if probated, or the legality of such will, if rejected by the court,
shall rest upon the person contesting such probation or
rejection of the will."
In the contest of a will on the ground of undue influence or
fraud the evidence required to establish such need not be of that
direct, affirmative and positive character which is required to
establish a tangible physical fact. The only positive and affirmative proof required is of facts and circumstances from which the
undue influence or fraud may be reasonably inferred, for direct
proof is rarely attainable. Parol evidence is admissable either
to prove or to conteract proof of a fraud or undue influence,
for the purpose in such case is not to vary or control what is
written, but to impeach the validity of the instrument itself. This
requirement as to the sufficiency of evidence to prove undue influence or fraud is likewise followed by the Washington decisions.
For In re Patterson's Estate, supra, the following rule was laid
down "Evidence must be produced that pressure was brought
to bear directly upon the testamentary act, but tins evidence itself
need not be direct. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient. It must,
however, do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof,
and such evidence has the force of proof only when circumstances
are proven which are inconsistent with the claim that the will
was the spontaneous act of the alleged testator. " Again, in the
case of In re Trestdder's Estate,2" this same doctrine was expressed
Cuthbert v.
19Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 43 L. Ed. 597 (1899)
In re Motz's Estate, 136
Cal. 558, 69 Pac. 294 (1902).
2034 Wash. 362, 75 Pac. 970 (1904).
"Rem. Rev. Stat. 1387.
Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1088 (1893)

"Parentheses

"70

ours.

Wash. 15, 125 Pac. 1034 (1912).
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thusly "From the very nature of things, undue influence can
rarely be proved by direct evidence. The relations of the parties,
surrounding circumstances, the habits and inclinations of the
testator, his purposes and wishes expressed, all furnish competent
sources for the guidance of the courts when called upon to decide
a case of this kind."

II.

BURDEN OF PROOF WHERE GENERAL CONFIDENTIAL RELATION
EXISTS.

While it has been held in a few jurisdictions that the existence
of confidential relations between the testator and a beneficiary
under his will creates a presumption of undue influence and casts
the burden of showing freedom from restraint on the beneficiary,24
the rule existing in a majority of jurisdictions wherein the question
has arisen is that a presumption of undue influence is not raised
and the burden of proof is not shifted by the mere fact that a
beneficiary occupies, as regards the testator, a confidential or
fiduciary relation, 25 such as that of attorney, guardian, employer,
landlord or a close business relation. The Washington court has
passed upon this presumption after a fashion, but has not laid
down a definite rule as to whether such a presumption of undue
influence is or is not raised when the beneficiary occupies such a
fiduciary relation to the testator. In the case of White v. White,"
an action was instituted to set aside a will, the petition alleging
that the will was executed under and because of undue influence
exerted upon the testatrix by her attorney and her guardian.
(But note that in this case the attorney who drew the will was
not a beneficiary thereunder.) The appellate court recognized
that only questions of fact were presented by the case and after
passing upon the competency of the testatrix to make the will
went on to say "It is argued by the appellant that the fiduciary
relation existing between the testatrix and her guardian and
her attorney are sufficient to show undue influence. While there
were confidential relations existing between these parties, we think
the evidence conclusively shows that the relation was not used in
any way to influence the testatrix in making her will." The court
in one sentence seems to pass the question by as being merely one
of fact, but it does indicate that no presumption of undue influence exists simply because the beneficiary holds a fiduciary relation with the testator, and thereby is in accord with the majority

III.

BURDEN OF PROOF WHERE THE ATTORNEY DRAWING THE WILL
IS A BENEFICIARY

We are now ready to consider the problem which faced the
California court in reaching their decision in the Erickson case,
"In re Moxley's WS., 103 Vt. 100, 152 Atl. 713 (1931) In re Bailey's
Estate, 186 Mich. 677, 153 N. W. 39 (1915).
25Ingle v. Salter, 180 Ia. 840, 163 N. W 447 (1917)
In re Holloway's Estate, 195 Cal, 711, 235 Pao. 1012 (1925) In re Sim'mon's Estate,
156 Minn. 144, 194 N. W 330 (1923) See Ginter v. Ginter 79 Kan. 721,
101 Pac. 634 (1909) for a lengthy discussion of this problem and a list of
authorities.
111 Wash. 354, 190 Pac. 1003 (1920).
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supra. Upon a close examination of the textbook authorities and
cases it appears that there is a decided conflict of authority as to
whether this drawing of the will by a beneficiary creates the presumption of undue influence practiced upon the testator. Gardner
on Wills, 2nd Edition, p. 165, holds that the mere fact that the
beneficiary wrote the will gives rise as a matter of law to no
presumption of undue influence. On the other hand Page in his
treatise of this subject at section 731 says "If an attorney draws
a will under which he takes a substantial benefit, a presumption
of undue influence arises." These two texts are indicative of the
uncertainty of the law in the various jurisdictions as to this point.
The California court clearly follows the rule that a presumption
does exist and places the burden of proof upon the proponents m
this situation.7 Therefore, the result reached in the Eickson case
was perfectly consistent with former holdings within that jurisdiction. The supreme courts of Michigan, Oklahoma, Iowa, Illinois
and New Jersey have likewise at one time or another followed
this rule. But in Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New York and
Texas we find that such a presumption does not exist shifting the
burden of proof to the proponents.
This particular question was squarely raised in Washington in
the case of In re Tresutder's Estate, supra. There the pertinent
facts showed that the will was in the handwriting of the sole beneficiary and the execution thereof was accompanied by other suspicious circumstances. The court in disposing of these facts said
"It is earnestly maintained that the burden of proof is on the
contestant, and that this burden has not been sustained. This is
true as a general rule, but when it is shown that the will as proposed is m the handwriting of the sole beneficiary, coupled with
the other suspicious circumstances, we think enough has been
shown, when considered in the light of the former wills to put the
executor to his proof that there was no undue influence." Upon
analyzing that opinion it would seem that the Washington court
would not raise the presumption of undue influence on the part
of the beneficiary attorney from this fact alone but would require
other suspicious circumstances being present at the execution of
the will. This was substantially the holding of the court several
8
years later in the case of In re Beck's Estate.2
There the two
beneficiaries under the will employed the scrivener to draw up the
will (the scrivener took nothing thereunder) The will was then
read to the testatrix but she was unable to understand the English
language sufficiently to comprehend the terms of the instrument.
The will was subsequently contested on the ground of undue influence as shown by these facts. The supreme court m ruling on
the case quoted approvingly from Rood on Wills, section 190,
-In re Morey's Estate, 147 Cal. 491, 82 Pac. 57 (1905) where it was
held that evidence showing that the will was drawn by the testator's
attorney at law and the attorney is named in the will as one of the
residuary legatees, is sufficient to raise the implication that the will
was procured by the undue influence of the attorney. This case was
quoted with approval by the court in the Erickson case.
"79 Wash. 331, 140 Pac. 340 (1914).
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which reads "If the testator was well and strong no presumption of undue influence or fraud arises from the fact that the person
who drew it up was favored by it. But if the testator was weak
and the scrivener benefited, slight circumstances in addition may
suffice to cast the burden upon him to show that there was no
fraud practiced and no undue influence exercised."
Thus it appears that although the court was not ruling on a case in which
the beneficiary attorney drew up the will, yet the court passes
upon tins question and again recognizes that before the presumption of undue influence will arise when the attorney drawing the
will is a beneficiary thereunder other suspicious circumstances
must surround the execution of the instrument. Tins question
again came before the court in the case of In re Adim's Estate,
supra. The grounds of this will contest were the alleged incapacity
of the testator and undue influence in procuring the making of
the will. The cause was tried before the lower court without a
jury and resulted in thle sustaining of the will, except as to one
bequest, winch was to the attorney who drew the will. The appeal
was made from that part of the judgment setting aside the bequest
to the attorney on the ground of undue influence. As to this
bequest to the attorney who drew the will, the trial court had held.
"That a legal presumption of undue influence arises and exists
as to the bequest made to the attorney under and in said will."
The appellate court in reviewing the case tended only to scrutinize
the facts, and reached the conclusion that there was no evidence
to sustain the charge of undue influence, without clearly passing
upon the presumption followed by the lower court, for we find this
statement. "Even though the burden were upon the beneficiary
of the bequest to show that no undue influence had been exercised,
the evidence in the case would fully meet and overcome such
burden." But in the concluding paragraph of the opinion we find
tins pertinent language- "The facts and the presumption both
sustain the will as written. While it may have been an error of
judgment for a beneficiary under the will to act as the draftsman
thereof, this in itself is not sufficient to defeat a bequest where
there is no evidence showing undue influence, and where the evidence upon the question given by creditable witnesses, is clear
and unequivocal in support of the view that the will as written
was as the testator desired it." There, the court after resting the
case upon the facts involved therein again comes out with a statement tending to uphold the rather vague rule as set out in their
previous cases to the effect that no unfavorable presumption
arises from the single fact that the beneficiary attorney drew up
the will. In the recent case of In re Adam's Estate,9 the facts
show that the testatrix, a widow, made her attorney who drew
the instrument the sole beneficiary, thereby raising the identical
problem in discussion. Upon her death the will was contested on
the ground of mental incompetency and undue influence of the
beneficiary thereunder. From a judgment sustaining the will the
contestant appealed. The appellate court in reversing the judg-164 Wash. 64, 1 PaR.

(2d) 840 (1931).
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ment based their decision alone upon the incompetency of the
testatrix. Justice Millard for the court said "We have disregarded the issue of undue influence which appellant insists, is
evidenced by failure of the respondent to have the decedent consult disinterested persons in the matter of giving her property
to her attorney " Once again the state supreme court based its
opinion upon other grounds and avoided a clear decision on our
problem in issue.
It is submitted, however, that the Washington court, although
perhaps frowning upon the drawing of a will by the attorney who
becomes a beneficiary thereunder, will not from this fact alone
raise a presumption of undue influence upon the testator, but will
require that other suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument tending to indicate this influence or fraud
be shown. Then, and only then, will the burden of proof be shifted
to the proponent of the will thereby showing that a presumption
of undue influence does exist.
ROBERT PALMER.

